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Research question
Labour economists in recent years have discussed intensively about the apparent inconsistency between the theory-based rule of equal wage for equal labour with the empirical observation that seemingly the same type of labour is paid differently (Abowd/Kramarz/Margolis 1999) . Similarly, IO researchers are puzzled by the fact that profit rates differ considerably between firms.
iv Mueller (1977) stated in his paper, "Persistence of Profits Above the Norm", that "In an efficient market economy, profits above or below the norm should quickly disappear." This statement is contrary to the theoretical findings of several empirical studies, that some firms are able to maintain an above average level of profits for extended periods of time. Persistent diversions from the average level of profits have been found for several countries (US: Qualls 1974 , Jacobson 1988 ; UK: Geroski/Jaquemin 1988 , Cubbins/Geroski 1987 Canada: Rigby 1991) .
Several theories have been discussed to explain these observed diversions (Roberts 2001) . However, the focus of this paper is in the measurement aspects. Ayanian (1975) , referring to Weiss (1969) and Bloch (1974) , remarks that if advertising expenditures are assessed to be intangible capital formation then the accounting rate of return could be potentially biased upwards by an amount, which is positively related to the firm's advertising intensity. Fisher/McGowan (1983) indicate the measurement problem that not all activities -such as R&D -are proper capitalized as they should be under economic aspects. Megna/Mueller (1991) suspect that the observed dispersion in return rates might be the result of a measurement errors caused by the insufficient consideration of intangible capital.
It is argued that the dispersion of the rate of return can only be justified as a test of the effectiveness of competition if it refers to total capital in use, including also unobserved capital. Observed differences in the return rate could be caused by the different use of account capital formation. In particular, expenses for R&D and for advertising made by the firms are frequently not counted as capital formation and therefore the capital stock used in production is underestimated.
iv Throughout this paper firm is used synonymously with establishment, the local unit.
There is a direct line from this argumentation to the increasing interest of researchers into the impact of so far unobserved intangible assets. Most of this interest in recent years has been with the growth aspects of intangible assets (Corrado/Hulten/Sichel 2004 Dougherty/Jorgenson (1997) found that considering also human and intangible capital, output growth in most of the G7 countries could almost entirely be explained by differences in total investment. Timmer/van Ark (2005) refers to ICT as a driver for productivity.
In this paper intangible capital formation at the firm level is capitalized to calculate return rates on total capital. The focus of the analysis is to question what extent observed dispersions in profitability of firms can be caused by production and use of assets so far neglected. First, we deal with the question: what would happen to the rate of return if unobserved capital formation and unobserved use of capital in a firm has to be assumed? In the second step, we analyse this question empirically based the most comprehensive firm level dataset for Germany. Marrano/Haskel/Wallis (2007) found that with a more comprehensive deduction and focus of growth aspects of intangibles that observed labour productivity at firm level, and for the economy as a whole, would be underestimated if hidden capital formation can be assumed. However, they did not elaborate the consequences for the firm level return rates. The following description is a streamlined reduction of the model of Marrano/Haskel/Wallis (2007) with focus on the return rates. The results are not only exclusively relevant for intangible assets, but can be applied on any type of hidden capital formation within a firm. With respect to the empirical part of the paper, the following discussion refers to hidden capital produced by the firms themselves and their own account intangibles.
Methodology

The problem
We assume a perfect competitive economic surrounding for a firm. The firm is producing two types of output. One type is assumed to be sold on the markets. We do not explicitly say whether is for consumption goods or for investment goods. For simplicity reasons, we have excluded the fact they could be intermediate goods. 
Another production function assumes that production of own account capital depends on labour input:
To simplify the deductions only labour is assumed as a factor of production.
The costs of total production are the expenses for wages and the costs for the use of capital, which are depreciations and operating surplus, .
We assume competitive prices for production, labour input, and the use of capital. The only relevant price for the following deductions is the rate of return, calculated as:
r might be assumed to be the competitive market rate of return for capital input K . For the discussion put forth here, it is sufficient to assume that it defines the "true" rate of return, calculated in respect to the total capital used in the firm and is the same for all types of capital in the firm.
Next, we assume that production and use of capital from own account production remains unobserved. At the micro level, accountancy legislation may be the reason. At the macro level, the reason could be that own account production is not related with market transactions such that it remains undiscovered for external observers, in particular, for statistical institutions. Intangible capital formation could be such a case. Other candidates for hidden use of capital could be land, inventories, and natural resources (OECD 2001) .
Observed output is then lower than total output because production of cannot be observed, while observed labour input and labour compensation W remain unchanged. Obviously observed labour productivity will also be lower. We want to quantify the net effect on the observed rate of return:
Both, observed depreciation and observed capital stock, will be lower. In contrast, wages W and labour input do not change, since labour input necessary to produce can be observed completely. Labour input and labour compensation used to produce the unobserved own account capital formation are now falsely allocated to the production of observed output . The basic assumption is that of asymmetric measurement: Capital formation and the use of capital with respect to own account production are not observed, while the other factors of production are. This implies a falsely specified production function for Y :
Observed operating surplus, calculated as a residual, is given with:
and can be converted into (3) . ) (
Observed operating surplus is the "true" operating surplus, minus net own account capital formation , the change in unobserved capital. In a growing economy, when capital formation tends to be higher than depreciation, we would have to expect that the observed values of operating surplus to be below those, which would arise, if all capital would be included.
Expanding the term ( ) with , yields with,
the growth rate of unobserved capital. "True" operating surplus P can be transformed to , and given equation, rK
The observed rate will equal the true rate of return, if there is no unobserved capital:
. If we have to assume that unobserved capital exists, then the observed rate of return will be above the market rate of return
r ; as long as the growth rate of hidden capital is below the market return rate on capital. In most economies, it can be expected that this will be the case for the majority of firms. However, it cannot be excluded that is below
if the growth rate of unobserved capital is higher than the market rate of return. In rare cases, if the growth rate of unobserved capital is more than twice the market rate of return, even negative observed return rates could occur.
Therefore, including unobserved intangibles into the calculation of the rate of return, results in a value below the one that can be observed. High correlations between expenditures for intangibles and observed profitability might be misleading. For instance, an innovation strategy that a firm pays out can only be assessed if the return rate for total capital is considered. In order for this to occur intangible assets have to be capitalized.
Measurement
If unobserved capital formation differs between firms, divergent return rates can be observed even if the market return rate is the same for all firms. Accounting for intangible capital as part of the unobserved capital might help to explain observed differences in return rates between firms.
It is broadly accepted that estimates on the use of intangibles in firms are extremely difficult and researchers often have to refer to simple plausible settings for many relevant 3. Management and marketing employees are assumed to produce OC assets with 20 % of their labour input.
4. In addition to the groups of employees in this study, 20 % of labour input done by self-employed is assumed to be part of own account organisational capital formation.
Many firm level studies rely on readily available databases such as COMPUSTAT, which is based on published balance sheets. While bigger firms described in this data set are quite reliable, small and medium sized firms (SMEs) are not covered; bearing the danger vii Even for tangible goods, problems exist in distinguishing empirically between goods used for investment, final, or intermediate consumption. This will not be elaborated further here.
viii Potential occurence of double counting, since the calculation of own account software already included in the National Accounts are partly based on the same source. that the conclusions might be biased x . To include SMEs into our firm-level analysis, an establishment level panel dataset (EUKLEED) for Germany is applied. EUKLEED is a comprehensive integrated micro data set on employment, investment, and output, based on the German social security data (Fritsch/Brixi 2004 implying a short service life of the assets. For Germany, there is some evidence that depreciation rates for intangibles might be lower. Tax authorities allow for a 5 year linear depreciation period on a "firm value" xiii bought by a company. Translated into the EU KLEMS methodology with geometric depreciation patterns, one would expect a depreciation rate of 0.20 or below.
Starting values for tangible capital stocks are calculated by using a modified version of a methodology suggested by Griffith (1999) . The relation between capital formation and capital stock by type of asset and industry from the EU KLEMS database is used. This relation is applied on firms existing at the first day of our observation period (1 January 1999) to calculate the opening stock of firm-specific capital. For intangibles time series for capital formation are back extrapolated based on a reduced trend of the development in the observation period, applying the sum formula for a geometric row:
This gives a very good approximation of the opening capital stock K at t = starting year if capital formation is growing continuously with the rate t I γ and T is chosen high enough in relation with the depreciation rate δ . In our case, a value for T = 100 proved to be sufficient.
Firms that do not exist at the beginning of the observation period are assumed to have an opening capital stock of zero. If a firm is closed before the end of a year, the average stock is reduced according to the days of its usage. This implies the assumption that the closing stock of the firm is sold to other firms xiv .
xiii
The "firm value" in this case is defined as the difference between the amount paid for the company and the sum of the replacement cost for all assets accounted for in the balance sheet.
xiv According to the definition given by ESA 95, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) of a firm is defined as new investment plus acquisition of used assets minus the sale of used assets. Table 1 gives an overview of the composition of the totals calculated from the firm-level estimates. Nearly 18 % of the total wage sum is classified as intangible capital formation. This amounts to 10 % of the total value added. Corrado/Hulten/Sichel (2006) calculate for the US 15 % of total income to be intangible capital formation, referring to the whole economy and including purchased intangibles.
Results
Aggregate results
Own account production of intangibles in our study accounts for more than 75 % of conventional capital formation as quantified in the National Accounts. One third of these expenditures are organisational capital formation. Organisational capital accounts for 32 % of total own account intangibles. For the UK, Marrano/Haskel/Wallis (2007) found that 50 % of total intangible investment could be attributed to economic competencies. Again, this figure is based on estimates for the whole economy including purchased intangibles and items not considered in our calculations. Own account production of intangibles does not only change capital formation and capital stock. Gross production, value added, depreciation, and operating surplus are affected. Gross production and value added increase by the production value of intangible capital formation. Operating surplus increase by net investment. These changes are calculated at firm level and consequently aggregated to compare the outcome with the reference EU KLEMS/National Accounts based calculations. The aggregated result can be derived from table 2.
As predicted in the methodological part, for the sum of all establishments the return rate for total capital is lower than the observed rate of return. Total capital stock is higher than in the conventional measure by the amount of cumulated net capital formation. Operating surplus is also higher, but not as much that with respect to the return rate it can compensate the increase in capital stock. 
Firm-level results
Firm specific rates of return on capital are calculated as operating profit (after deductions of labour compensation for self-employed) divided through average capital stock of the year. Table 3 describes firm level indicators for the conventional return rates analysed with the establishment data set.
The first column describes the average return rate weighted with the size of the firms' capital stock. This is the rate that is found in conventional aggregate analysis. It changes over time according to the macroeconomic changes of operating surplus in the business cycle. All other columns refer to non-weighted firm-level results. Note that all establishments have the same weight independently of their size, which is quite a natural assumption in IO analysis of entrepreneurial behaviour. Since the majority of establishments in the analysis are very small, the return rates of small firms exert a strong influence on the results. 
Percentiles year
If there would be no dispersion in the return rates between firms all three measures: the weighted mean, the mean, and the median would return the same value. However, the dispersion of return rates, measured as standard deviation, is considerable. The median remains relatively stable over time and the lower percentile shows that a number of firms have negative returns. High return rates can be observed for the upper percentile with very extreme values. The results seem to be heavily influenced by outliers in the sense that a number of firms earn an operating surplus per unit of capital, which is extremely above the average. A possible explanation for such extreme return rates could be that operating surplus includes elements, which should economically be counted as costs: for example, the costs of the use of intangibles.
As expected, the assumption of additional creation and use of intangible assets reduces the overall rate of return (table 4). Assuming own account production created by employees, reduces the mean of the return rates. This refers not so much to the weighted mean, which indicates that a considerable amount of the dispersion is caused by smaller units. The stable median and the reduction of the upper percentile support this fact. That fact that the lower percentile does not change economically makes sense. In this area, we can assume that the difference between observed and marked rate of return is comparatively low and it is difficult to imagine that negative return rates are persistent. It would be more probable that firms with negative profits cease to exist. The impact of intangibles produced by self-employed must also be analysed. This is measured by the weighted mean and the reduction in the average return rates induced by those intangibles produced by the self-employed. These tend to be negligible. This could be explained with the fact that intangible production of the self-employed is mainly relevant for smaller establishments. The raw average return rate, the mean of the return rates of all establishments, shows that the assumptions made to make unobserved capital observable do not only reduce the overall level of observed profitability but also change the relative levels between the establishments. The standard deviation is reduced dramatically. This is mainly due to the reduction of extreme above average return rates as the 90th percentiles shows. Contrary, the 10th percentiles do not change so much and a slight convergence between the weighted mean and the median can be observed if intangibles produced by the self-employed are included into the calculations.
Conclusions
A critical assessment of these results has to acknowledge that they depend heavily on at least two relevant settings: First, nobody really knows what share of wage expenditures in a firm can be assumed to be classified as capital formation; in the sense that these expenditures are made in expectation of future returns. We apply for each firm the same share as found in the literature for the aggregate. These shares might be higher or lower for a specific firm. Second, depreciation rates for intangibles are assumed to be high. We apply the ones found in the literature, but lower depreciation rates might be more realistic.
To assess the impact of the assumptions made, alternative calculations will be necessary to check for the robustness of the results. It is quite transparent that intangible capital will increase with higher expenditure shares and lower depreciation rates. Both operating surplus as well as capital stock will increase. However, the impact on the rate of return has to be evaluated empirically.
Despite this, the results clearly support the preposition that a considerable part of the observed dispersion in return rates among firms could be contributed to unobserved capital formation in intangible capital. Firms with high input in intangibles also have an above average observed rate of return. The findings make clear that any causal analysis of the relationship between innovations and profitability will have to control for unobserved intangibles.
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